Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg

View Judgment: https://lawyerslibrary.in/books/oreg/

Court: Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 11061 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 2998 of 2022)
Bench: *Dipankar Datta, J. & Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
Date of Judgment: April 23, 2025
Citation: 2025 INSC 552 : 2025 KLT OnLine 1867

Limitation – Suit for Cancellation of Sale Deeds and Recovery of Possession – Sale deeds executed in 1992, suit filed in 2003 – Primary relief of cancellation governed by Article 59 of Limitation Act, 1963, prescribing 3-year limitation from date of knowledge – Suit barred by limitation as filed beyond 3 years from plaintiffs’ knowledge of sale deeds – Article 65 (12-year limitation for possession) inapplicable where cancellation is primary relief – Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood (2019) distinguished, prior precedents in Khatri Hotels (2011) and Rajpal Singh (2022) followed – Suit dismissed as time-barred.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 (Lis Pendens) – Sale deeds executed during pendency of suit with ad-interim injunction – Second suit compromised, suggesting collusion – No proof of appellants’ knowledge of injunction – Section 52 does not render transfers void ab initio, only subjects them to suit’s outcome – Collusive suits excepted from lis pendens – Sale deeds not void.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 41 (Bona Fide Purchaser) – Ramesh Chand’s name mutated in revenue records since 1956, collected rent, portrayed as owner – Appellants, bona fide purchasers for value, protected under Section 41 – Pleadings sufficient to invoke Section 41 despite not expressly cited.

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 68 (Proof of Will) – Will of 1951, basis of plaintiffs’ title, not proved – Certified copy produced without evidence of original’s loss – Section 68 mandates proof by attesting witness, not dispensed with by non-denial – Section 90A (UP Amendment) precludes presumption for documents forming basis of suit – Will not proved, plaintiffs’ title not established.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Suit for Possession without Declaration – Registered sale deeds created cloud on title – Suit for possession without declaration or cancellation unsustainable – Plaintiffs’ attempt to abandon cancellation and seek declaration belatedly rejected – First appellate court erred in decreeing possession without declaring title – Anathula Sudhakar (2008) and Sopanrao (2019) applied.

Res Judicata – Prior Suits – Compromise decrees in prior suits not binding on appellants, non-parties to those suits – No admission of Will by appellants or their predecessor – Res judicata inapplicable.

Held: Trial court’s dismissal of suit restored – First appellate and High Court judgments set aside – Suit barred by limitation, sale deeds not void, Will not proved, and possession decree without declaration unsustainable – Civil appeal allowed, no costs.

Cases Referred: Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126; Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260; Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood, (2019) 7 SCC 76; G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321; Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena, (2017) 1 SCC 257; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594.

Parties

• Appellants: Rajeev Gupta & Ors. (Defendants 2 to 5 in the suit)
• Respondents: Prashant Garg & Ors. (Plaintiffs and other defendants)

Background

• The dispute concerns House No. 49/1, Nai Mandi, Muzaffarnagar, bequeathed by Dr. Babu Ram Garg via a Will dated October 17, 1951, to his sons Ishwar Chand and Dr. Karam Chand, excluding Ramesh Chand, who received a pharmacy business and Rs. 5,000.
• A 1956 family settlement mutated the property in the names of Leelawati (Ishwar Chand’s wife) and Ramesh Chand. Subsequent suits and compromises followed:
  • 1987 Suit: Leelawati’s suit against Ramesh Chand for the western portion was compromised.
  • 1992 Suit: Dr. Karam Chand’s suit for injunction against Ramesh Chand and Ishwar Chand’s heirs resulted in an ex-parte injunction on June 15, 1992, and was compromised in October 1992.
• During the 1992 suit, Ramesh Chand executed sale deeds on June 16 and 29, 1992, transferring the southern and eastern portions to the appellants for Rs. 80,000. These were registered, and appellants took possession.
• In 2003, Dr. Karam Chand and his son Prashant Garg filed a suit (Original Suit No. 117/2003) against the appellants, seeking cancellation of the 1992 sale deeds, recovery of possession, and injunction, alleging Ramesh Chand lacked title.

Procedural History

• Trial Court (2015): Dismissed the suit, holding:
  • The Will was not proved under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, and no presumption applied under Section 90A (UP Amendment).
  • The suit was barred by limitation (Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963 – 3 years for cancellation).
  • Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act (ToP Act) protected appellants as bona fide purchasers.
  • The 1992 suit was collusive, excepting the sale deeds from lis pendens (Section 52, ToP Act).
• First Appellate Court (2017): Reversed the trial court, decreeing the suit:
  • Held the Will was proved by prior compromises.
  • Sale deeds were void (no title in Ramesh Chand, hit by lis pendens).
  • Article 65 (12-year limitation for possession) applied, not Article 59.
• High Court (2021): Upheld the first appellate court, confirming the suit was within limitation (Article 65) and sale deeds were void due to lis pendens.

Issues

1. Was the suit barred by limitation?
2. Were the sale deeds void due to lis pendens or lack of title in Ramesh Chand?
3. Was the Will proved, and did prior compromises establish its validity?
4. Could the suit succeed without a declaration of title or cancellation of sale deeds?

Supreme Court’s Findings and Reasoning

1. Limitation:
   • The primary relief was cancellation of the 1992 sale deeds, governed by Article 59 (3 years from knowledge). Plaintiffs knew of the sale deeds in 1992 (execution/possession by appellants), but filed the suit in 2003, beyond the 3-year limit.
   • Article 65 (12 years for possession) was inapplicable as cancellation was the substantive relief, per Rajpal Singh (2022) and Khatri Hotels (2011).
   • Sopanrao (2019), suggesting a 12-year limit for possession suits, was distinguished as it lacked consideration of prior precedents.
   • The suit was barred by limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
2. Validity of Sale Deeds:
   • Lis Pendens (Section 52, ToP Act): The 1992 suit’s injunction did not render the sale deeds void ab initio; transfers during lis pendens are subject to the suit’s outcome (G.T. Girish, 2022). The 1992 suit’s quick compromise and lack of evidence of appellants’ knowledge of the injunction suggested collusion, excepting the deeds from Section 52.
   • Section 41 (ToP Act): Ramesh Chand’s name in revenue records since 1956 and rent collection portrayed him as the owner. Appellants, as bona fide purchasers for value, were protected under Section 41. Pleadings were sufficient to invoke this provision.
3. Proof of Will:
   • The Will, the basis of plaintiffs’ title, was not proved under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, requiring an attesting witness (Ramesh Verma, 2017). Only a certified copy was produced in 2003, with no evidence of the original’s loss (Benga Behera, 2007).
   • Section 90A (UP Amendment) precluded presumption for the Will as it formed the suit’s basis.
   • Prior compromises in 1987 and 1992 suits did not bind appellants (non-parties) or constitute res judicata. Appellants denied the Will’s existence, placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove it.
4. Suit Without Declaration/Cancellation:
   • Registered sale deeds created a cloud on title, requiring a declaration of title or cancellation for a possession suit to succeed (Anathula Sudhakar, 2008; Sopanrao, 2019).
   • Plaintiffs’ abandonment of cancellation and failed attempt to add a declaration relief rendered the plaint defective. The first appellate court erred in decreeing possession without declaring title.

Decision

• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court and first appellate court judgments, and restored the trial court’s dismissal of the suit.
• The suit was barred by limitation, the sale deeds were not void, the Will was not proved, and the possession decree without declaration was unsustainable.
• No costs were awarded.

Key Precedents

• Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126: Limitation under Article 58 runs from when the right to sue first accrues.
• Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260: In composite suits, limitation is determined by the primary relief (cancellation, 3 years).
• G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321: Lis pendens does not void transfers but subjects them to the suit’s outcome.
• Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena, (2017) 1 SCC 257: Will must be proved under Section 68, even if not denied.
• Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594: Suit for possession requires declaration if title is disputed.

Below is a detailed analysis of the key precedents cited in Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors., 2025 INSC 552, along with their relevant observations as relied upon by the Supreme Court. The court used these precedents to address issues of limitation, validity of sale deeds, proof of a Will, and the necessity of declaratory relief in a suit for possession.

1. Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126

• Context: This case examined the limitation period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, vis-à-vis Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for suits seeking declaratory relief.
• Observation:
  • The court noted a linguistic distinction between Article 120 (1908 Act), which states limitation begins “when the right to sue accrues,” and Article 58 (1963 Act), which uses “when the right to sue first accrues.” The inclusion of “first” in Article 58 means the limitation period starts from the initial accrual of the right to sue, not subsequent violations.
  • Paragraph 30: “While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word ‘first’ has been used between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: The court applied this principle to hold that the limitation for the plaintiffs’ suit (seeking cancellation of sale deeds) under Article 59 began in 1992 when they first learned of the sale deeds. Filing the suit in 2003 was beyond the 3-year limit, rendering it time-barred.

2. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335

• Context: A three-judge bench decision addressing when the right to sue accrues under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
• Observation:
  • The right to sue accrues when the defendant clearly and unequivocally threatens to infringe the plaintiff’s right. Not every threat compels a suit; it must effectively invade or jeopardize the right.
  • Paragraph 34: “The right to sue under Article 120 of the Limitation Act accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Cited in conjunction with Khatri Hotels to emphasize that the plaintiffs’ right to sue accrued in 1992 upon execution of the sale deeds and appellants’ possession, which jeopardized their rights, triggering the limitation period.

3. Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260

• Context: A three-judge bench decision addressing limitation under Article 113 (residual provision) in the context of Order VII Rule 11, CPC (rejection of plaint).
• Observation:
  • Article 113, unlike Articles 58, 59, or 104, does not specify a particular event but refers to “when the right to sue accrues,” covering continuing breaches or torts. Courts should not read “first” into Article 113, as it would rewrite the provision.
  • Paragraph 19: “The view taken by the trial court… would inevitably entail in reading the expression in Article 113 as – when the right to sue (first) accrues. This would be rewriting of that provision and doing violence to the legislative intent.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Used to distinguish Article 58 and 59 (which use “first”) from Article 113, reinforcing that the limitation for cancellation (Article 59) began when plaintiffs first knew of the sale deeds in 1992.

4. Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd., (2004) 2 SCC 247

• Context: A three-judge bench decision delineating the distinction between Articles 58 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
• Observation:
  • Article 58’s limitation runs from “when the right to sue first accrues,” while Article 113 counts from “when the right to sue accrues,” allowing computation from the last accrual in certain cases.
  • Paragraph 21: “The distinction between Article 58 and Article 113 is… that the right to sue may accrue to a suitor in a given case at different points of time and, thus, whereas in terms of Article 58 the period of limitation would be reckoned from the date on which the cause of action arose first, in the latter the period of limitation would be differently computed depending upon the last day when the cause of action therefor arose.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Supported the court’s interpretation that Article 59’s 3-year limitation for cancellation began in 1992, not later, as the plaintiffs’ right to sue first accrued then.

5. Madhukar Vishwanath v. Madhao, (1999) 9 SCC 446

• Context: A three-judge bench decision on limitation for a suit by a minor seeking to set aside alienation by a guardian.
• Observation:
  • Where the primary relief is declaratory (e.g., setting aside alienation), Article 60 applies, not Article 65 (possession). Possession is a consequential relief.
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Reinforced that cancellation of the sale deeds was the primary relief, governed by Article 59 (3 years), not Article 65 (12 years for possession).

6. L.C. Hanumanthappa v. H.B. Shivakumar, (2016) 1 SCC 332

• Context: Addressed limitation in a suit for declaration and consequential relief.
• Observation:
  • Affirmed Madhukar Vishwanath that the limitation period is determined by the primary declaratory relief, not consequential possession.
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Cited to support that the suit’s limitation was governed by Article 59 (cancellation) rather than Article 65 (possession).

7. Rajpal Singh v. Saroj, (2022) 15 SCC 260

• Context: Addressed limitation in a composite suit for cancellation of a sale deed and recovery of possession.
• Observation:
  • In composite suits, limitation is determined by the primary relief of cancellation (3 years under Article 59), not the consequential relief of possession (12 years under Article 65).
  • Paragraph 14: “When a composite suit is filed for cancellation of the sale deed as well as for recovery of the possession, the limitation period is required to be considered with respect to the substantive relief of cancellation of the sale deed, which would be three years from the date of the knowledge of the sale deed sought to be cancelled.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Directly applied to hold that the suit, primarily seeking cancellation, was barred by limitation as filed 11 years after knowledge of the 1992 sale deeds.

8. Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood, (2019) 7 SCC 76

• Context: A three-judge bench decision on limitation in a suit for possession and declaration of title.
• Observation:
  • In a suit for possession based on title, the limitation is 12 years under Article 65, even if a declaratory relief is sought, as possession is the main relief.
  • Paragraph 9: “The limitation for filing a suit for possession on the basis of title is 12 years and, therefore, the suit is within limitation. Merely because one of the reliefs sought is of declaration that will not mean that the outer limitation of 12 years is lost.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta:
  • The plaintiffs relied heavily on this case to argue a 12-year limitation under Article 65. However, the court distinguished it, noting that Sopanrao did not consider prior precedents like Khatri Hotels and Rajpal Singh.
  • The court held that cancellation was the primary relief in this case, not possession, making Article 59 applicable. Additionally, Sopanrao’s observation that a plaintiff must prove title and seek declaration in a possession suit supported the court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ suit was defective without a declaration.

9. G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju, (2022) 12 SCC 321

• Context: Addressed the effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens) on transfers during pending litigation.
• Observation:
  • Transfers during lis pendens are not void but are subject to the suit’s outcome. They create rights between the parties to the sale, extinguishing the transferor’s rights.
  • Paragraph 137: “A transfer which is made lis pendens it is settled law, is not a void document. It does create rights as between the parties to the sale… All that Section 52 of the Transfer Property Act provides is that the transfer which is made during the pendency of the proceeding is subjected to the final result of the litigation.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: The court held that the 1992 sale deeds were not void ab initio due to lis pendens, as Section 52 only subjects transfers to the suit’s outcome. The collusive nature of the 1992 suit’s compromise further excepted the deeds from Section 52.

10. Ramesh Verma v. Lajesh Saxena, (2017) 1 SCC 257

• Context: Addressed the requirement of proving a Will under Section 68 of the Evidence Act.
• Observation:
  • A Will must be proved by satisfactory evidence, including calling at least one attesting witness, even if the opposite party does not deny its execution.
  • Paragraph 13: “The propounder of the will is called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator… This is the mandate of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and the position remains the same even in a case where the opposite party does not specifically deny the execution of the document in the written statement.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: The court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the 1951 Will under Section 68, as only a certified copy was produced without evidence of the original’s loss or an attesting witness’s testimony.

11. Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, (2007) 9 SCC 728

• Context: Addressed the admissibility of secondary evidence (certified copy) for a document forming the basis of title.
• Observation:
  • Secondary evidence under Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act requires proof of the original’s loss beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Paragraph 31: “A document upon which a title is based is required to be proved by primary evidence, and secondary evidence may be given under Section 65(c)… Loss of the original, therefore, was required to be proved.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: The plaintiffs’ reliance on a certified copy of the Will without proving the original’s loss was insufficient, rendering the Will unproved.

12. Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 178

• Context: Addressed the requirements for adducing secondary evidence under the Evidence Act.
• Observation:
  • Secondary evidence requires foundational facts to explain the absence of primary evidence. Without a plausible reason, secondary evidence is impermissible.
  • Paragraph 14: “Where original documents are not produced without a plausible reason and factual foundation for laying secondary evidence not established it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence.”
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: Reinforced that the plaintiffs’ failure to explain the absence of the original Will barred reliance on its certified copy.

13. Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594

• Context: Addressed the necessity of declaratory relief in suits involving disputed title.
• Observation:
  • Where a plaintiff’s title is under a cloud or disputed, and they are not in possession, a suit for declaration, possession, and injunction is required.
• Application in Rajeev Gupta: The court held that the registered sale deeds created a cloud on title, necessitating a declaration or cancellation. The first appellate court erred in decreeing possession without such relief.

Summary of Precedents’ Impact

• Limitation: Precedents like Khatri Hotels, Rajpal Singh, and others clarified that Article 59’s 3-year limitation for cancellation applied, as it was the primary relief, rendering the suit time-barred.
• Sale Deeds’ Validity: G.T. Girish established that lis pendens does not void transfers, and the collusive 1992 suit excepted the deeds from Section 52. Section 41 protected the appellants as bona fide purchasers.
• Proof of Will: Ramesh Verma, Benga Behera, and Jagmail Singh underscored the mandatory proof of a Will under Section 68 and the need for foundational facts for secondary evidence, leading to the Will’s rejection.
• Necessity of Declaration: Anathula Sudhakar and Sopanrao affirmed that a possession suit requires a declaration when title is disputed, making the plaintiffs’ suit defective without such relief.

These precedents collectively guided the Supreme Court to restore the trial court’s dismissal, overturning the first appellate and High Court judgments.

Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs)

1. What was the primary relief sought in the suit filed by Prashant Garg and others in 2003?
   a) Recovery of possession only
   b) Cancellation of sale deeds
   c) Declaration of title
   d) Permanent injunction only
   Answer: b) Cancellation of sale deeds
   Explanation: The suit primarily sought cancellation of the 1992 sale deeds, with recovery of possession and injunction as consequential reliefs, as determined by the Supreme Court.
2. Which article of the Limitation Act, 1963, was held to govern the suit’s limitation period?
   a) Article 58
   b) Article 59
   c) Article 65
   d) Article 113
   Answer: b) Article 59
   Explanation: The court held that Article 59 (3 years for cancellation of an instrument) applied, as cancellation was the primary relief, not Article 65 (12 years for possession).
3. Why was the suit held to be barred by limitation?
   a) It was filed 12 years after the cause of action arose
   b) The plaintiffs lacked title to the property
   c) It was filed 11 years after the plaintiffs’ knowledge of the sale deeds
   d) The Will was not proved
   Answer: c) It was filed 11 years after the plaintiffs’ knowledge of the sale deeds
   Explanation: The plaintiffs knew of the 1992 sale deeds in 1992, but filed the suit in 2003, beyond the 3-year limit under Article 59.
4. What was the Supreme Court’s finding regarding the applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens)?
   a) The sale deeds were void ab initio due to lis pendens
   b) The sale deeds were valid, as the 1992 suit was collusive
   c) The appellants had knowledge of the injunction, making the deeds void
   d) Lis pendens did not apply due to lack of registration
   Answer: b) The sale deeds were valid, as the 1992 suit was collusive
   Explanation: The court found the 1992 suit collusive, excepting the sale deeds from lis pendens, and noted no proof of appellants’ knowledge of the injunction.
5. Under which provision were the appellants protected as bona fide purchasers?
   a) Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act
   b) Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act
   c) Section 68 of the Evidence Act
   d) Section 90A of the Evidence Act
   Answer: a) Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act
   Explanation: The appellants were protected under Section 41 as bona fide purchasers for value, given Ramesh Chand’s portrayal as the owner via revenue records and rent collection.
6. Why was the 1951 Will not considered proved?
   a) It was not registered
   b) No attesting witness was called, and loss of the original was not proved
   c) The appellants admitted its validity
   d) It was not produced before the High Court
   Answer: b) No attesting witness was called, and loss of the original was not proved
   Explanation: Section 68 of the Evidence Act required an attesting witness, and the plaintiffs failed to prove the original Will’s loss to rely on a certified copy.
7. What precedent did the Supreme Court distinguish to reject the plaintiffs’ reliance on a 12-year limitation period?
   a) Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India
   b) Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood
   c) Rajpal Singh v. Saroj
   d) G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju
   Answer: b) Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood
   Explanation: The court distinguished Sopanrao (2019), which suggested a 12-year limit for possession suits, as it did not consider prior precedents like Khatri Hotels and Rajpal Singh.
8. Why could the plaintiffs not succeed without seeking a declaration of title?
   a) The sale deeds were unregistered
   b) The registered sale deeds created a cloud on title
   c) The plaintiffs were in possession of the property
   d) The Will was admitted by all parties
   Answer: b) The registered sale deeds created a cloud on title
   Explanation: Per Anathula Sudhakar (2008), a declaration was required due to the cloud on title created by the registered sale deeds, making a bare possession suit unsustainable.
9. What was the effect of the compromise decrees in the 1987 and 1992 suits on the appellants?
   a) They were binding due to res judicata
   b) They admitted the Will’s validity for all parties
   c) They were not binding, as appellants were not parties
   d) They voided the sale deeds
   Answer: c) They were not binding, as appellants were not parties
   Explanation: The appellants, not parties to the prior suits, were not bound by the compromises, and res judicata did not apply.
10. Which court’s decision was ultimately restored by the Supreme Court?
    a) High Court
    b) First Appellate Court
    c) Trial Court
    d) None of the above
    Answer: c) Trial Court
    Explanation: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and first appellate court judgments, restoring the trial court’s dismissal of the suit.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. What was the main issue in Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors.?
   The main issue was whether the plaintiffs’ 2003 suit for cancellation of 1992 sale deeds, recovery of possession, and injunction was barred by limitation, and whether the sale deeds were valid, the Will was proved, and a possession suit could succeed without a declaration of title.
2. Why did the Supreme Court hold the suit to be barred by limitation?
   The court held that the primary relief was cancellation of the sale deeds, governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (3 years from knowledge). The plaintiffs knew of the sale deeds in 1992 but filed the suit in 2003, 11 years later, making it time-barred.
3. How did the court address the doctrine of lis pendens in this case?
   The court held that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens) did not render the 1992 sale deeds void ab initio, as they were only subject to the 1992 suit’s outcome. The suit’s collusive compromise and lack of evidence of appellants’ knowledge of the injunction excepted the deeds from lis pendens.
4. What role did Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act play in the judgment?
   Section 41 protected the appellants as bona fide purchasers for value, as Ramesh Chand was portrayed as the owner through revenue records since 1956 and rent collection, making it reasonable for the appellants to believe he had title.
5. Why was the 1951 Will not accepted as proved?
   The Will was not proved under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, which requires an attesting witness. The plaintiffs produced only a certified copy without proving the original’s loss, and Section 90A (UP Amendment) precluded any presumption, as the Will was the basis of the suit.
6. Why did the plaintiffs’ suit fail without a declaration of title?
   The registered sale deeds created a cloud on the plaintiffs’ title, requiring a declaration or cancellation to succeed in a possession suit, as per Anathula Sudhakar (2008). The plaintiffs’ abandonment of cancellation and failed attempt to add a declaration made the suit defective.
7. How did the court handle the plaintiffs’ reliance on Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood?
   The court distinguished Sopanrao (2019), which suggested a 12-year limitation for possession suits, noting it did not consider prior precedents like Khatri Hotels and Rajpal Singh. The court held that cancellation, not possession, was the primary relief, governed by Article 59.
8. Were the compromise decrees in the 1987 and 1992 suits binding on the appellants?
   No, the compromises were not binding on the appellants, who were not parties to those suits. Res judicata did not apply, and the appellants’ denial of the Will’s existence placed the burden on the plaintiffs to prove it.
9. What precedents were most influential in the Supreme Court’s decision?
   Key precedents included:
   • Khatri Hotels (2011) and Rajpal Singh (2022) for limitation under Article 59.
   • G.T. Girish (2022) for lis pendens under Section 52.
   • Ramesh Verma (2017) and Benga Behera (2007) for proof of a Will.
   • Anathula Sudhakar (2008) for the necessity of declaratory relief.
10. What was the final outcome of the case?
    The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court and first appellate court judgments, and restored the trial court’s dismissal of the suit, finding it barred by limitation, the sale deeds valid, the Will unproved, and the possession decree unsustainable without a declaration.